Acret Award & The 2009 Year in Review: Developments in California Design and Construction Law

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THE YEAR 2009 IN REVIEW:
DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA DESIGN
AND CONSTRUCTION LAW

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I. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION


Following the close of escrow, homeowners discovered that the adjacent country club’s pool and fence encroached upon their property, and alleged that the seller improperly failed to disclose the encroachment. The parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute before a retired judge affiliated with JAMS. Prior to arbitration, the title company paid the country club for a lot-line adjustment, giving the purchasers clean title, but purchasers continued to seek damages for diminution in value of their property. The arbitrator granted purchasers’ motion to exclude evidence regarding the financial effect of the lot-line adjustment, and awarded purchasers approximately $1.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The seller moved to vacate the award pursuant to section 1268.2(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that its rights were substantially prejudiced by the arbitrator’s refusal to hear material evidence. The trial court vacated the award and the appellate court denied purchasers’ petition for writ of mandate, noting that the JAMS rules themselves require arbitrators to give all parties the chance to present material evidence.

II. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS LITIGATION


In a suit against the developer and seller of an apartment complex alleging latent construction defects, summary judgment for cross-defendant subcontractors is reversed where: 1) the exemption from the 10-year statute of limitations for "actions based on willful misconduct" applied to cross-complaints for indemnity; and 2) a willful misconduct claim could be made in a cross-complaint by incorporating by reference allegations contained in the complaint.


In 1997, a townhome association consisting of 11 separate buildings and 61 units undertook a re-roofing project. A few months after the project was completed, one homeowner submitted a written complaint to the townhome association regarding moisture entering around one window of her townhome. No other complaints were made until six years later, when numerous leaks occurred and an investigation uncovered numerous causes of the leaks. In 2004, seven years after the re-roofing project was completed, the townhome association filed a construction defect case against those involved in the project. The defendants obtained summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, arguing alternatively that the alleged defect was patent and the lawsuit was filed more than four years after substantial completion of the
reroofing project or that the leak was a latent condition about which the plaintiff had inquiry notice more than three years before the lawsuit was filed.

On appeal the townhome association argued that the single complaint in 1997 did not, as a matter of law, mean the roof defects were patent. Nor did that single complaint put the association on notice of the need to investigate what was wrong with the roofs. The Court of Appeal agreed. Given the size of the townhome complex, the limited nature of the original complaint, and the expert declaration that there were many causes of leaks that could not be readily appreciated by laypersons, the Court of Appeal concluded that as a matter of law the single complaint of a leak did not create a patent defect for purposes of the four-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1. The Court of Appeal also concluded that the single complaint was insufficient to trigger the three-year statute of limitations for latent defects in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15. It was unwilling to make a ruling that would force owners to perform extensive, expensive investigations in response to minor complaints.


The defendant was a developer that built a home and recorded a notice of completion for it in 1995. Two years later, the defendant sold the home to the plaintiff. Nine years after purchasing the home (and eleven years after it was completed), the plaintiff filed a construction defect suit against the defendant alleging claims for negligence and breach of implied warranty. The plaintiff attempted to avoid the bar of the ten-year statute of repose in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15 with two arguments: (1) the defendant's ownership of the home for two years after its completion precluded the defendant from being a builder eligible for the protection of the statute of repose; and (2) the ten-year period of the statute of repose was tolled during the two-year interval between the home's completion and plaintiff's purchase of it. Both the trial and appellate courts rejected plaintiff's arguments. There was no evidence that the builder's actions following completion created the problems about which plaintiff was complaining. All of the issues arose out of the actual construction of the home. In addition, plaintiff could cite no authority for the proposition that the date a developer sells a home triggers the running of the ten-year period rather than the date of substantial completion of the improvement, as section 337.15 expressly states.


In the 1960's, the County of San Diego operated a landfill on property it leased from the San Diego Unified School District. After the landfill was closed, the School District built a junior high school on the property in 1968. More than thirty years later, the County and the School District entered into a cost sharing agreement to address costs of complying with groundwater clean-up and methane gas monitoring requirements imposed by several regulatory authorities. In 2004, the District filed suit against the County for, among other things, breach of the cost sharing agreement as well as breach of a hold harmless clause in the original lease.

The County succeeded in obtaining summary judgment as to the entire action, arguing that all claims arose out of an alleged latent defect in the construction of the landfill, the landfill
was substantially completed by 1967, and the lawsuit filed in 2004 was well beyond the 10-year statute of repose in Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15. The trial court relied on case law establishing that a landfill is a "work of improvement" under section 337.15 (Gaggero v. County of San Diego, 124 Cal. App. 4th 609 (2009)) and that the 10-year statute of repose does not contain an exception for pollution claims (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1009 (1994)).

The Court of Appeal reversed. In analyzing whether claims are time-barred under section 337.15, the nature of the injury or loss governs, not the label associated with the cause of action. The Court of Appeal concluded that the School District's lawsuit was not seeking to enforce its primary right to have the landfill constructed in accordance with the applicable standard of care and thus the lawsuit was not subject to the 10-year statute of repose. Instead, the District was suing to enforce its contractual rights under the cost sharing agreement and the original lease, as well as to require the County to shoulder its responsibilities as a landfill operator under environmental laws.


In 2002, the California Legislature enacted a "Fix-It" law (Civil Code section 910 et seq.) that created a series of prelitigation procedures designed to give a home buyer an opportunity to repair defects before a home buyer can file suit. The initial steps under the "Fix-It" law are for the buyer to give the builder written notice of its claims (Civil Code section 910) and for the builder to disclose certain information to the buyer within a specified time (Civil Code section 912). A builder who fails to comply with the prelitigation procedures forfeits the protections afforded by the statutes. Civil Code section 912.

In Standard Pacific, the plaintiff home buyer filed a construction defect suit without first giving the builder the required written notice of claims and opportunity to repair the defects. As allowed by the statute, the builder filed a motion to stay the lawsuit until the plaintiff complied with statutory prelitigation procedures. The trial court denied the motion to stay, agreeing with plaintiff that it was the builder's burden to show it had complied with the statutory procedures before it could seek a stay. The Court of Appeal reversed and rejected the buyer's contention that it had the discretion to "opt-in" to the procedures. The Court of Appeal instead held that the buyer bears the burden of showing that it is excused from complying with the prelitigation procedures by affirmatively showing that the builder had failed to comply with its obligations under the "Fix-It" law.


The plaintiff bought a condominium that the defendant seller had owned for nearly 20 years. During that time the condominium complex had experienced repeated incidents of water intrusion and flooding on the lower level. The homeowner's association filed two lawsuits because of water intrusion, first against the developer, then against the contractor that performed repairs. Prior to the sale, the seller disclosed the facts of the water intrusion and repairs, and
recommended that the buyer hire its own inspector. But the seller did not disclose the fact of the two lawsuits.

After purchasing the unit and experiencing flooding, plaintiff filed suit against the seller alleging the seller breached his common law duty of disclosure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller, stating that by disclosing the facts surrounding the water intrusion and flooding, the seller had made a sufficient disclosure of the defects. The Court of Appeal reversed. While the seller had made an adequate disclosure of the fact of the water intrusion itself (and plaintiff's own inspector found ample evidence of the water intrusion and damage), the seller did not disclose the existence of either lawsuit. The buyer thus was not able to evaluate his purchase with the benefit of information from the lawsuits, including with respect to the length of time the problems had existed, the ineffective rounds of repairs, and the limited budget for performing repairs. The Court of Appeal concluded there was at least a triable issue of material fact as to whether the seller was obligated to disclose the lawsuits as material facts affecting the value and desirability of the condominium.

III. CONTRACTOR LICENSING

1. **AB 370, Amending Business & Professions Code Sections 7028 and 7028.6**

   Increases penalties for contracting without a license for those who perform home improvement valued at $500 or more for labor and materials. Also includes that a person who uses the services of an unlicensed contractor is considered a crime victim and eligible for restitution, regardless of whether that person knew the contractor did not have a license.


   Plaintiff entered into what was called a "Development Management Agreement" with an owner to assist in the development of a property. The agreement stated that its purpose was to provide professional development and construction management services to the owner. Owner also hired a general contractor to perform the construction. After the project was completed and the building sold, the CM sued the owner, contending it had not been paid out of sales of the building in accordance with the agreement. The trial court granted the owner's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff CM lacked a general contractor's license. The Court of Appeal reversed, observing that the contractors state license law does not identify construction managers as workers requiring licensure, and that the CM did not perform any of the activities identified in section 7026 of the Business and Professions Code. Further, the court noted that under section 4525(e) of the Government Code, construction managers on public works projects must be licensed, but there is no parallel law for private work projects. Therefore, the court held that a CM on a private work of improvement who does not undertake actual construction work directly or through subcontractors is not required to have a contractors license.

A drywall subcontractor, Humberto, was retained by Sanders Construction Co., the general contractor on a hotel project. Humberto’s license had expired prior to work beginning, and Sanders at some point discovered that fact, but continued to work with Humberto. Humberto did not pay its workers, who filed wage claims against Sanders with the State Labor Commissioner. The hearing officer cited the holding in Hunts Building Corp. v. Bernick, 79 Cal. App. 4th 213, 220 (2000) "Labor Code § 2750.5 operates to conclusively determine that a general contractor is the employer of not only its unlicensed subcontractors but also those employed by the unlicensed subcontractors." On that basis, the hearing officer determined that Sanders was the statutory employer of the workers employed by the unlicensed subcontractor, entitling them to recover wages and interest from Sanders. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that a general contractor may be liable for the unpaid wages of workers hired by an unlicensed subcontractor. As a corollary, the Court noted that although the employees were not themselves licensed, section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code requiring a license to sue for compensation does not apply to a person who receives wages as his sole compensation who does not engage in independent business and who cannot control how the work is performed.


A general partnership consisted of three partners. Only Mr. Golen, the RME, was licensed. Golen executed a disassociation notice in accordance with section 7076(c) of the Business & Professions Code which provides that "a partnership license shall be canceled upon the disassociation of a general partner or upon the dissolution of the partnership . . . The remaining general partner or partners may request a continuance of the license to complete projects contracted for or in progress prior to the date of disassociation or dissolution for a reasonable length of time . . . " After Golen filed his disassociation notice, the partnership entered into a residential construction project. Following completion, the homeowner sued the partnership for defective construction. In addition to seeking damages for repair of the defective work, she also sought disgorgement of the $32,000 paid to the partnership, pursuant to section 7031(b) of the Business & Professions Code. The issue on appeal was limited to whether the trial court erred in entering a judgment in favor of the owner on the refund of payment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the substantial compliance doctrine did not apply because Golen's association with the partnership ended on May 24, 2003, and neither remaining partner was licensed before entering into the June 2003 contract. In contrast, the partnership was licensed at one time and so did meet the first prong of the substantial compliance doctrine. However, it did not meet the remaining requirement: both partners knew that they were not licensed and that the RME had executed a disassociation, but they did not act with prompt good faith efforts to secure a license.

The Whites retained Criddlebaugh and JC Master Builders, Inc. (collectively, the "contractor") to build a log cabin. Due to various concerns, the Whites terminated the construction contract. The parties filed complaints against one another, the contractor to foreclose on its mechanic's lien, among other things, and the homeowners to recover disgorgement of amounts paid, among other things. On appeal, the court considered, among other things, "whether the Whites properly brought a claim for reimbursement under section 7031(b).” The appellate court concluded that the contractor was not qualified to be licensed because the responsible managing officer was not actively engaged in the business and had appointed another (unlicensed) individual to oversee the "dealings and daily work" of the contractor. Therefore, its license was suspended by operation of law and disgorgement under section 7031(b) was authorized. The court further considered "whether the recovery of compensation authorized by section 7031(b) [may] be reduced by offsets for materials and service provided or by claims for indemnity and contribution?" The court concluded that it may not, and that under the express terms of the statute, "unlicensed contractors are required to return all compensation received without reductions or offsets for the value of the materials or services provided."


A water district was sued for declaratory relief alleging that it was performing well drilling services without a C-57 water well contractor’s license in violation of Water Code section 13750.5, which requires all persons working on wells to hold such license. The District contended that the Water Code provision did not apply to it based on statutory exceptions enumerated in Business & Professions Code sections 7000, *et seq.*, and its demurrer was sustained. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the Water Code statute governed the licensing requirement because it was created to protect the public health and welfare from water contamination, which is broader than the licensing laws codified in the Business & Professions Code whose sole purpose is consumer protection. The court held that the Water Code mandates a license without exception, and observed that the statute would be satisfied if the District’s supervisor of construction were licensed.


At issue on a motion to dismiss and for change of venue or transfer was the question of whether Frontier could avoid California’s contractor licensing requirement because the construction contract for a California public work of improvement provided that Colorado law applied. The district court denied the motion, declining to enforce the choice-of-law provision on the ground that the interests of the forum state (California) were materially greater than the interests of the chosen state: “California’s interests in protecting the public from unlicensed contractors would be more seriously impaired if the choice-of-law provision were
enforced.” The court also rejected Frontier’s argument that the work it performed did not require a contractor’s license because it was fabricating a pre-engineered metal building pursuant to plans and specifications.

IV. MECHANIC’S LIENS, LIS PENDENS AND BONDS

A. Mechanic’s Liens

1. **AB 457, Amending Civil Code Sections 3084 and 3146 (eff. 1/1/11)**

   To date, mechanic’s lien filing procedures have not included a requirement that property owners be notified when a lien is placed against their property. Therefore, many liens have not been pursued and have become void and unenforceable by operation of law, clouding the title of the property on which they were filed. Consequently, consumers have been left with the responsibility of addressing the lien before engaging in financial transactions involving the property. With this new law, claimants intending to file mechanic’s liens will be required to notify owners that a mechanic’s lien is being recorded against their property by serving owner with a notice of lien, along with a copy of the actual lien; otherwise, the lien will be unenforceable. Additionally, it will also be mandatory that a lis pendens be recorded within 20 days of filing a foreclosure action. Although the law grew out of concern for homeowners by the CSLB, as presently written, it will affect commercial projects as well as residential.


   A lumber company owned a saw mill which included several lumber-drying kilns. The kilns were bolted to a concrete slab constructed with steel frames and aluminum walls, and were supplied with electricity and sprinklers. When the kilns were originally installed, they were deemed improvements of the land for property tax purposes. The lumber company retained a contractor to remove the kilns through a series of subcontracts. United Rentals Northwest, Inc. rented equipment for use in removing the kilns. United Rentals was not paid for the equipment and recorded a mechanic’s lien against the saw mill. The lumber company argued that removal of the kilns was not a work of improvement subject to a mechanic’s lien, but rather constituted personal property. In a case of first impression, the court held that removal of the kilns fell within the description of a work of improvement set forth in section 3106 of the Civil Code, which includes the demolition and the removal of buildings. The court observed that the kilns were metal structures that were two-stories tall, were attached to concrete foundations, enclosed thousands of square feet of space, had windows and doors, included staircases and places for people to work, were supplied with electricity, stood for between eight and 21 years, and that the cost of removing them was nearly $300,000. Although the court found no published California cases applying the mechanic’s lien statutes to facts involving only the demolition or removal of a building, it also observed that section 3106 is not ambiguous in referring to "the demolition of buildings, and the removal of buildings." Therefore, the mechanic’s lien law applied to this work.

A construction manager entered into a Construction Management Agreement in connection with improvements to an open pit mine. The agreement included such services as obtaining construction permits, reviewing plans and drawings, furnishing corrections and design change proposals, value engineering, interfacing with the architect and engineers, participating in design change meetings, soliciting bids, determining the scope of work to be bid by various trades, developing purchase orders, determining methods of cost-savings, supervising, managing, directing and scheduling construction, monitoring and inspecting the work, scheduling and interfacing with building inspectors, preparing and tracking budgets and costs, providing safety meetings and training, preparing progress and safety reports, and attending progress and safety meetings. The owner terminated the construction management contract and the construction manager recorded a mechanic’s lien and initiated a foreclosure action. Owner moved to dismiss the foreclosure claim on the basis that, as a construction manager, plaintiff was not among the class of persons entitled to assert a mechanic’s lien under Civil Code section 3110. The District Court concluded that the allegations pleaded were sufficient to withstand challenge, observing that although plaintiff's primary role appeared to be supervisory, it also included services that bestowed skill or other necessary services to be used in the construction of a building, rendering it among the class of persons entitled to assert a mechanic’s lien.

B. Lis Pendens


The parties arbitrated an easement dispute pursuant to the requirements of a lease. The holder of the easements recorded a lis pendens, and the owner filed an action for slander of title. The trial court held that the recording was privileged under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The appellate court reversed. Code of Civil Procedure section 405.20 states that “[a] party to an action” may record a notice of pendency of action. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a lis pendens can be recorded only when a court action is pending.

C. Payment Bonds


First National Insurance Company issued a payment and performance bond for the prime contractor, Cam Painting, and also issued a similar bond to Cam’s subcontractor, SABCO Electrique. Both Cam and SABCO signed indemnity agreements in favor of surety. SABCO failed to pay one of its suppliers, which subsequently commenced a lawsuit asserting a cause of action against Cam and the surety on Cam’s payment bond. In response, CAM cross-complained, asserting a cause of action against the surety on the SABCO performance bond. Thereafter, SABCO cross-complained against the surety on the Cam bond. The surety paid the supplier’s claim, allocated half of the payment to each bond, and filed a cross-complaint seeking
indemnity from each of the principals. The trial court ruled that surety was entitled to so allocate the loss to both bonds. The appellate court reversed, holding that the surety must pay the supplier's claim entirely from the bond of the principal with whom the supplier was in privity, i.e., SABCO. It observed that the purpose of the subcontractor payment bond was to pay subcontractor debts so that the prime contractor would not have to enter into a dispute with its subcontractor. The court also held that Cam should not have been charged with attorneys' fees incurred by the surety; indeed, the surety was liable to Cam for its attorneys' fees.


A concrete piling supplier made a claim on a public works payment bond and a stop notice release bond, and filed a lawsuit to enforce said claims. The trial court granted the supplier summary judgment on the grounds that the supplier had established the elements of its claims whereas the sureties failed to meet their burden regarding affirmative defenses thereto. Indeed, the sureties' separate statements did not even identify affirmative defenses, let alone advance proposed material facts or proffer admissible evidence in support of any affirmative defenses. The trial court denied sureties' request to continue the hearing in order to give them an opportunity to revise their separate statements as sureties failed to submit an affidavit making a good faith showing as to why a continuance was needed in order to obtain essential facts, as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the deficiencies in sureties' separate statements were substantive and not merely a "curable procedural defect."

V. **PROMPT PAYMENT**


At completion of a public work of improvement, the general contractor withheld retention as a result of a dispute over additional work claims and also because the subcontractor failed to provide conditional lien releases as was contractually required for payment. The subcontractor sued for penalties under the prompt payment statutes, specifically section 7107 of the Public Contract Code (governing payment of retention) and section 7108.5 of the Business & Professions Code (relating to progress payments). The trial court agreed that the general contractor was entitled to withhold retention in view of the dispute and the failure to furnish lien releases, and therefore had not violated the prompt payment statutes. In affirming the judgment, the appellate court held that the unambiguous language of Public Contract Code section 7107 allows the withholding of retention for *any* good faith dispute between a general contractor and a subcontractor. The appellate court also held that the parties' contractual agreement that "payment is not due until Subcontractor has furnished . . . applicable releases pursuant to Civil Code section 3262" altered the timing, and constituted a waiver, of the payment requirements of section 7108.5.
VI. PUBLIC WORKS OF IMPROVEMENT

A. Design-Build

1. Public Contract Code Section 20133.

The statute authorizing counties to use the design-build contracting method was amended to require any county that elects to proceed under the statute to pay a fee to the Department of Industrial Relations ("DIR") to defray the DIR's costs of monitoring compliance with and enforcing prevailing wage requirements for the project.


The Legislative Analyst's Office ("LAO") recently published its report regarding the effectiveness of design-build contracting based on information gathered from counties that had used the method. This report is required by Public Contract Code section 20133, which is set to expire in January 2011. The LAO received information on 15 projects, only 5 of which have been completed. Based on the limited sample and the lack of parallel projects using the traditional design-bid-build method that could be used for comparison purposes, the LAO was hesitant to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the design-build legislation. Despite the inconclusive results, the report recommends that the design-build legislation be renewed and that all of the current design-build statutes scattered throughout the Government, Education, and Public Contract Codes be consolidated into a single, uniform, design-build statute.

B. MBE, WBE, and DVBE Goals

1. AB 21, amending Public Contract Code Section 10115.2.

Under prior law, state contracts could be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder that either met the statewide goals for minority business enterprises, women business enterprises, and disabled veteran business enterprises contained in the State Contract Act or demonstrated making good faith efforts toward meeting the goals. AB 21 eliminates good faith efforts as an alternative to actually meeting the goals. Under the new law, state contracts must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder that actually meets the 15% MBE, 5% WBE, and 3% DVBE goals set in Public Contract Code section 10115(c).
C. **Design Immunity**

1. **Alvis v. County of Ventura, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494 (2d Dist. 2009)**

   Family members of those who were injured or died during the January 2005 landslide at the beach community of La Conchita sued Ventura County claiming that a retaining wall designed and constructed by the County at the base of a steep cliff created a dangerous condition that caused the landslide to overwhelm several homes. The County moved for summary judgment on the ground that the claims were barred by the design immunity afforded by Government Code section 830.6. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.

   The appellate decision focused on two issues. First, the plaintiffs opposed the motion with an expert's declaration that the County-designed retaining wall failed, causing the cliff above it to collapse. A few years earlier, however, the same expert had submitted a report to an insurance company stating that the landslide was initiated toward the top of the cliff and rapidly flowed downward. Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that the unexplained contradictions between the expert's declaration and his prior statements prevented the declaration from constituting evidence of the wall causing the failure sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.

   Second, the plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate the County lost its design immunity when the retaining wall design became dangerous because of changed physical conditions after the wall was constructed. Plaintiffs claimed that the retaining wall in actual operation failed to allow water to drain properly, causing pressure to build behind the wall, and ultimately causing the wall to fail during a heavy rainstorm. Both courts rejected these arguments. The County engineers who designed the wall had considered and provided for water drainage in their wall design. Thus the "changed condition" cited by plaintiffs was simply one of the factors considered as part of the original design. The courts were unwilling to allow the plaintiffs to second-guess the original design decisions by characterizing design considerations (such as the build-up of water pressure and the need for drainage) as "changed conditions."

D. **California High-Speed Rail**

1. **Opinions of the Attorney General, No. 07-1002 (February 27, 2009)**

   The California High-Speed Rail Authority ("HSRA"), which was created by the California High-Speed Rail Act of 1996 for the purpose of developing a plan for the financing, construction, and operation of a statewide, intercity high-speed passenger rail system, is authorized to exercise the powers set forth in Public Utilities Code section 185036. These include the authority to acquire rights-of-way, enter into design and construction contracts, and issue debt secured by pledges of state funds, federal grants, or project revenues. HSRA received partial authority to implement section 185036 through 2002 legislation, and full authority by the
California voters' approval, in the November 2008 general election, of the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act for the 21st Century. The ballot measure approved the sale of up to $9.95 billion in bonds to finance the project.

VII. PREVAILING WAGE/EMPLOYMENT LAW


   In its 2004 decision City of Long Beach v. Division of Industrial Relations, 34 Cal. 4th 942, the California Supreme Court explicitly left unresolved the questions whether the prevailing wage laws in the Labor Code (§ § 1720 – 1780) were a matter of statewide concern and whether a public works project undertaken by a charter city is a municipal affair exempt from prevailing wage laws. Following the City of Long Beach decision, the California Legislature issued a resolution aimed at eliminating the resulting uncertainty by stating that payment of prevailing wages on public projects is a matter of statewide concern and its intent is for prevailing wage laws to apply to charter cities.

   In anticipation of several large capital projects that could be constructed for less money if it was exempt from paying prevailing wages, the City of Vista in 2007 asked voters to approve a ballot measure establishing the city as a charter city. After becoming a charter city, Vista prepared design-build contract documents for two of the upcoming projects that did not require payment of prevailing wages. Trade unions filed a peremptory writ of mandate asking that Vista be required to comply with the state's prevailing wage laws.

   The Fourth District Court of Appeal answered both of the questions left unresolved by the City of Long Beach case and produced a decision completely at odds with the Legislature's resolution. Citing the facts that many construction projects in California (namely, all private projects) are exempt from prevailing wage laws altogether and that numerous projects with some element of public funding or support are also exempt (such as projects receiving certain types of tax credits), the Court of Appeal concluded that the state's prevailing wage laws are not a matter of statewide concern. It also concluded that Vista's interest in controlling how it spends its own local tax dollars on its public works projects was a municipal affair that trumped the application of the prevailing wage laws.

   The case is currently under review by the California Supreme Court, which will now decide the questions left open by the City of Long Beach decision.
VIII. INSURANCE

1. AB 2738, Amending Civil Code Sections 2782, 2782.9, 2782.95 and 2782.96

This legislation affects wrap-up policies in residential, commercial and public works construction, and also restricts indemnity clauses in residential projects. Among other things, the statutes place restrictions on self-insured retentions, require disclosure of certain policy terms, and make unenforceable clauses requiring subcontractors to reimburse insurance or defense costs for claims unrelated to their scope of work.


Although not arising out of a construction dispute, this case involves key insurance decisions which are relevant to the building industry. Commencing in 1955, the State commenced using a site in the desert called Stringfellow for industrial waste disposal on the mistaken assumption that impermeable rock underlay the site. Because the underlying rock was, in fact, permeable, the site suffered severe groundwater contamination and was ultimately closed. In 1998, the State was found liable for negligence and for all past and future remediation costs of approximately $700 million. The State sought indemnity from its liability insurers, and went to trial against six excess liability insurers, each of whose policies covered a two or three year period and obligated them to pay the State for losses arising out of injury to, or destruction of, property on a per-occurrence basis. Occurrence was defined as "an accident or a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which result in . . . damage to property during the policy period . . ." The court engaged in a thorough discussion of progressive property damage insurance law, and the holdings were as follows:

i. Where progressive property damage spans several policy periods, the "all sums" rule applies, i.e., one insurer is liable to the insured for the entirety of the damage, and that insurer, in turn, may seek contribution from other insurers on the risk.

ii. Where progressive property damage spans several policy periods, the insured can "stack" limits of successive liability policies triggered by the continuous loss.

iii. When an insured is covered under a third-party liability policy for the cost of mitigating a covered loss, the insured's failure to mitigate the loss does not diminish the insurer's coverage obligation.


Homeowners had a bathroom remodeled, during which time unbeknownst to them, a nail was driven through a pipe. Over time, corrosion around the nail caused a leak and
extensive water damage. The homeowners filed a claim with their insurer which claim was denied on the ground the damage was an excluded loss. The homeowners’ policy provided all risk coverage for the dwelling, but excluded loss arising out of corrosion and rust; loss arising out of continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water from a plumbing system; and loss arising out of third-party negligence in workmanship or construction. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, on the ground that the claim was excluded as a loss not insured. The appellate court affirmed.


A water district hired Griffin to construct a sewer bypass, which then backed up and caused damage to a residence. After the district paid the homeowners’ claim, it sued Griffin for reimbursement. Griffin’s CGL insurer refused to defend based on a “total pollution exclusion” in the policy, and the reasonableness of its position was supported by existing case law. However, Griffin’s excess insurer provided a defense. Moreover, after the insured filed a bad faith lawsuit against the CGL insurer, the latter changed its mind and settled the lawsuit without the insured suffering any loss. Griffin continued to proceed with its bad faith lawsuit, during which time, the Supreme Court issued its decision in MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635 (2003), which interpreted the total pollution exclusion. The jury ultimately awarded the insured $1 million to compensate the insured for its costs “to collect the benefits due under the contract” and $10 million in punitive damages. In considering whether the insurer’s denial of a defense was reasonable, the appellate court reversed the judgment. The court engaged in a thorough discussion of the defense obligation, including the “potentiality rule” (where there is any potential for the insured’s liability based on the facts alleged in the complaint and facts known to the insurer at the time of the coverage decision, there is an obligation to defend), and application of the objectively reasonable standard (wherein the reasonableness of the insurer’s position is a question of law for the bench to decide).


This was an equitable contribution action between two insurers of a general contractor. A homeowner sued the contractor for defective work, including conditions that did or would result in water damage. The contractor tendered its defense to Claremont, which had issued a primary CGL policy and excess/umbrella policy both effective in the year 2001, and also tendered to North American which had issued a CGL policy for the year 2002. Both insurers agreed to defend under the CGL policies, subject to reservations of rights. A settlement was reached to which Claremont and North American contributed unequal sums. North American sued Claremont on the ground that it did not contribute its equitable share. The Claremont policies both contained contractors warranty endorsements as conditions of coverage, i.e., providing that coverage would not apply to operations performed by subcontractors unless the insured obtain an indemnity agreement and a certificate of insurance from them. In this case, the insured obtained these from some, but not all of its subcontractors. The trial court concluded that this endorsement was enforceable in both Claremont policies and that the insured’s failure to comply precluded coverage for operations performed by subcontractors from whom the agreement and certificate were not obtained, and precluded the right of North American to obtain
contribution from Claremont for such operations under either policy. The appellate court agreed. The trial court also concluded that the contract completion date for triggering completed operations coverage, i.e., the date when the residence was “put to its intended use,” was the date when the notice of completion was recorded and not the much earlier date when the owner moved into the home. The appellate court agreed, observing that “a residence might be partially inhabited prior to the date of completion, and not yet be put to its ‘intended use’ because the owner does not have full use of the facilities.”

IX. SAFETY/PERSONAL INJURY


A homeowner hired an unlicensed contractor to perform remodeling work. On his second day of work, an employee of the contractor was injured while working on a ladder. The worker sued the homeowner for negligence. In rejecting the homeowner's contention that the worker's exclusive remedy was through the workers' compensation system, the Court of Appeal recognized the well settled law that a worker hired by an unlicensed contractor who in turn was hired by a homeowner does not come within the workers' compensation system unless the worker has worked 52 hours in the 90 days preceding the injury. Labor Code section 3351(d). Because the worker had not met the minimum hour requirement by the time he was injured, the homeowner was not insulated from an ordinary negligence claim by the workers' compensation laws. The Court of Appeal, however, affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the homeowner on the negligence claim. The Court concluded that the undisputed evidence revealed no negligence on the part of the homeowner. Instead, it was the worker who placed, adjusted, and climbed the ladder and who chose to perform a risky maneuver from a height of nine feet that ultimately caused his injury.


Homeowners hired an unlicensed contractor to replace the roof on their home. On his first day of work, an employee of the contractor fell through the roof and was seriously injured. The injured worker sued the homeowners, alleging that because the contractor was unlicensed, the homeowners were the worker's employer. And as an employer, the homeowners had a duty to maintain a safe work environment in accordance with OSHA regulations, as well as a duty to warn of the dangerous condition of the roof.

The Court of Appeal concluded that under Labor Code section 2750.3, which provides a rebuttable presumption that a person who performs services for which a license is required is an employee rather than an independent contractor, the worker was the employee of the homeowners with respect to potential tort liability. But the Court concluded that the re-roofing project was exempted from the safe workplace regulations of OSHA. Labor Code section 6303(b) excludes "household domestic service" from the definition of employment. The Court determined that the safe workplace regulatory scheme was not intended to apply to homeowners who hire workers to perform re-roofing or other remodeling work.
   **Dist., December 18, 2009.**

Two employees of a general contractor on a tenant improvement project were seriously injured by an ungrounded light fixture. They filed a negligence lawsuit against a subcontractor working on the same project. Although the subcontractor did not create the dangerous condition, one of its employees had encountered it a few weeks earlier, but the subcontractor had failed to report the condition to the general contractor or anyone else. The trial court granted the subcontractor's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The appellate court agreed that the subcontractor on a multiemployer project did not have a common law duty to protect the employees of others. But the court concluded the subcontractor could have faced citation by Cal-OSHA under Labor Code section 6400 and Cal-OSHA's regulation 336.11. Relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in *Elsner v. Uveges*, 34 Cal. 4th 915 (2004), the appellate court held that plaintiffs can rely on Cal-OSHA provisions to establish the existence of a duty of care, regardless of whether the plaintiff is an employee or not. Thus the court ruled that a subcontractor whose own employees are exposed to a dangerous condition at a multiemployer site has a duty to protect the employees of other contractors working at the site.