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Can Antitrust Compliance Affect Leniency and Enforcement? The Chemicals Cartel Pattern

22 September 2021 | 12:15 pm CEST

Organized by the Global Competition Law Centre of the College of Europe

The query is whether a significant investment in compliance measures can prompt earlier reporting of cartels in return for leniency and a drop in the number of infringements. The chemical cartels represent an interesting study (of the 69 cartel decisions delivered by the Commission between 2000-2010, 28 involved chemical products). An internal corporate amnesty programme can also represent a unique feature.  Join this virtual lunch talk for an insightful discussion. 


Jacques Derenne, Sheppard Mullin & GCLC


Maria Jaspers, European Commission

Andreas Stephan, University of East Anglia

Gianni De Stefano, European Commission (former Global Director of Competition Law at Akzo Nobel NV)


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